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Perceptive questioning by James C. Lothian and comments by Anna Schwartz
wrested the admission that my theoretical framework could not explain the high
unemployment rates of 1934 through 1941 unless millions of people were gainfully
employed as "unemployed." Thinking of generous unemployment insurance, I had
no idea that my hyperbole would prove literally correct. Mrs. Schwartz's
incomparable knowledge of data resources provided the key references. The
regression was run on the NBER's Troll system by Nurhan Helvacian.ABSTRACT
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An Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941
A major conceptual error in the standard BLS and Lebergottunemployment
estimates for 1933-1943 is reported. Emergency workers (employees of federalcon-
tracyclical programs such as WPA) were counted as unemployed on a normal-jobs-to-
be-created instead of job-seekers unemployment definition. For 1934-1941, the
corrected unemployment levels are reduced by two to three-and-a half millionpeople
and the rates by 4 to 7 percentage points. The corrected data showstrong movement
toward the natural unemployment rate after 1933 and arevery well explained by an
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Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees
Have Been Mislaid; Or, An
Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941
When Keynesian, post-Keynesian, or neo-Keynesian economists denounce the
central monetarist proposition that the economy converges to full-employment in
the absence of shocks, the prime empirical contradiction is the well-known per-
sistence of high (though falling) levels of unemployment from 1934 through 1941.
If convergence to full employment is so slow, it is argued, it might as well be
ignored. So the explanation of this era is the central challenge to monetarist or
dynamic economists. Despite inmense theoretical and empirical effort, no real
answer has been given.
This paper argues that the inability of monetarist models to explain such
large, persistent unemployment rates is an asset, because those unemployment rates
did not in fact exist. The previously reported unemployment rates include among
the unemployed literally millions of employees on the payrolls of government emer-
gency relief projects such as the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian
Conservation Corps. On neither modern search theory nor Keynesian grounds should
contracyclical government employment be counted instead as unemployment.
Section I demonstrates that the standard unemployment series1 do indeed count
"emergency workers" as unemployed and suggests the reasoning which led to this mis-
conception. Corrected data for employment, unemployment, and the unemployment rate
are presented in Section II. It is shown in Section III that the corrected data
are consistent with a search approach to unemployment in which deviations of the
actual from the natural level of unemployment are explained by deviations of actual
from anticipated levels of wages and prices. My summary and conclusions follow.2
1. The Standard Treatment of Emergency Workers
There are two standard data sets for the labor force, employment, and un-
employment from 1929 through 1943: the official Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
data and the Lebergott data taken from Stanley Lebergott's book (1964). Either
series could be called the "Lebergott data" since the original presentation of
the BLS data is in Lebergott (1948).2 Though both standard data sets thus can
be attributed to Lebergott, the treatment of "emergency workers" as unemployed
was standard practice in the estimates of that period.3
Lebergott (1948) —perhapstoo inured to the Census Bureau definition —
makesno mention whatsoever of the exclusion of emergency workers from employed
and their inclusion in unemployed. This practice can be confirmed only by tracing
back to the Census Bureau source document for the 1940 to 1946 data to which the
1929-1939 estimates are tied.4 I found only one explicit statement by Lebergott
on the inclusion of emergency workers among the unemployed:
These estimates for the years prior to 1940 are intended
to measure the number of persons who are totally unemployed,
having no work at all. For the 1930's this concept, however,
does include one large group of persons who had both work and
income from work—those on emergency work. In the United
States we are concerned with measuring lack of regular work
and do not minimize the total by excluding persons with made
work or emergency jobs. This contrasts sharply, for example,
with the German practice during the 1930's when persons in
the labor force camps were classed as employed, and Soviet
practice which includes employment in labor camps, If it in-
cludes it at all, as employment.53
Ifweexclude the forced analogy of the W.P.A. to Nazi laborcamps and sup-
pose that Lebergott did nothing more than follow conmion practice in the 1930's,
the question remains whether there is any valid rationale for this treatment.
The answer appears to depend upon the particular year in question. From 1930
through 1932, work relief was used as an apparently minor part of the general re-
lief program of some states and cities6 although this increased in the latterpart
of 1932 under Reconstruction Finance Corporation advances (repayment later waived)
"for relief and work relief to needy and distressed people and in relieving the
hardships resulting from unemployment."7 Work under these programs was generally
for a few hours per week and could hardly be said to constituteemployment. So
it was certainly a reasonable decision to count these recipients of work relief
as unemployed rather than as government employees. Note however that the national
S incomeaccounts do treat these as wage rather than transfer payments.
Substantial federal subsidies for state relief (including work relief) con-
tinued through November of 1933. State work relief recipients are estimated to
have averaged 1.72 million people in 1933.8 This implies an annualaverage wage—
based on the national income accounts data—of $197.80 or less than 20percent of
the average annual earnings per full-time employee. So although enrollment in
state programs increased in this year from about 1 percent to about 3percent of
the labor force,9 the programs could certainly still be classedas government re-
lief rather than employment programs.
Various New Deal programs created what is known as theemergency government
labor force. Broadly speaking, theseemergency workers can be divided into two
classes: (1) Those working in youth (16 to 24 years)programs under the Civilian
•
Conservation Corps (CCC, April 1933-June 1943) and the out-of-school National
Youth Administration (NYA, January 1936-May 1943)programs. (2) The much larger
regular program consisting of the Civil Works Administration (CWA, November 1933-
July 1934), the Emergency Work-Relief Program (April 1934-December 1935) of the4
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and the Works Progress Adminis-
tration (WPA, July 1935-June 1943, titled Work Projects Administration beginning
July 1939). The regular programs, which employed on average 82 percent of the
emergency labor force, were mainly (75 to 85 percent of expenditures) involved
in construction projects. FERA's Emergency Work-Relief Program was operated
through state agencies but the others were directly administered by the federal
government.
The emergency government labor force worked on qualitatively different terms
than the earlier state work-relief recipients. Jobs were substantially full-time
(24 to 40 hours per week) and at competitive wages)° Preference was given to
those eligible for relief, but this was not a bar to unemployed people. The pro-
grams were mainly aimed at and attractive to unskilled labor. From 1934 through
1940, annual wages were about one-half of the annual average earnings per full-
time employee in all industries, as shown in Table 1. So here, the national income
accountants are undoubtedly correct in treating emergency workers as government em-
ployees receiving payment for labor services.
From the Keynesian viewpoint, labor voluntarily employed on contracyclical
construction and other government projects should certainly be counted as employed.
On the search approach to unemployment, a person who accepts a job and withdraws
from the activity of search is clearly employed. The contracyclical intent of the
government employer is irrelevant to the definition of unemployment as currently
used by the BLS.
Besides bureaucratic inertia which carried forward the earlier treatment of
state rk-relIef recipients, the misclassification of emergency workers can be
attributed to an implicit definition of unemployment as the difference between
the normal labor force and those employed in normal jobs. The pioneering esti-
mates by the National Industrial Conference Board (NTCB) aimed at estimating
how many jobs would have to be created in order to get back to a normal situation5
of no depression and therefore no emergency government laborforce.Measuring
jobs-to-be-created leads to different treatment than measuring people without work
who are seeking it)' Of course, no consideration was given to emergency employ-
ment's crowding-out private employment or the state and local construction work
which it replaced.
In sununary, counting state work-relief recipients as unemployed was justif led
by the facts12—. they had both time and incentive to search for alternative employ-
ment. Counting members of the emergency government labor force as unemployed re-
presents a major conceptual error)36
It. Corrected Estimates for 1929-1943
It is straightforward to correct the BLS and Lebergott data for the mis-
classification of emergency workers. Both the standard and corrected data are
presented in Table 2. Comparing the standard'4 and corrected unemployment figures
in cOlumns (12) and (13), it is clear that the misclassification of emergency wor-
kers almost completely masked both the speed and strength of the return of unem-
ployment toward normal, levels in 1934 through 1941. The employment level for 1936
is understated in the standard data by over three-and-a-half million people and by
over two million as late as 1941.
.
Thisdifference is seen most clearly in terms of the unemployment rates re-
ported in Table 3. For example, the Lebergott data overstate the unemployment rate
by 0.9 percentage point in 1933. This rises to 4.8 in 1934,4.9in 1935, and a fu1 6.9
percentage points in 1936. Not until 1941 was the overstatement down to even. 39
percentage points. Put another way, the reported reduction of unemploymentfrom
1932 to 1936 was only about a half of the actual reduction.
S7
III.An Anticipations-Search Explanation of the Corrected Data
The corrected unemployment rates for 1934 through 1940 are still high, though
no longer absurdly so. Since 1900 the unemployment rate shows "no discernible
trend."5 Except for the 1900's and 1930's,every decade in the twentieth cen-
tury has shownanaverage unemployment rate of 5 percent'6—about the current
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. The question naturally arises
whether the corrected data are consistent with a model in which the unemployment
rate tends to the natural rate in the absence of shocks.
Robert Lucas and Leonard Rapping (1972) have shown that from 1930 through
1933, their simple search model (1969) does well both qualitatively and quantita-
tively.17 It does slightly better with the corrected data for 1933. Presumably,
•




a1log (W/W) + 82 log
where u is the unemployment rate, a0 is the natural unemployment rate, W and
are the actual andanticipatednominal wage levels andPand P are the actual
and anticipated price levels. Lucas and Rapping report that their model fails to
explain high levels of unemployment from 1934 through 1941 because rapid increases
in nominal wages imply that the unemployment rate should fall to near the natural
rate in 1934 or at the very latest by 1937. Even the corrected data show a nnich
lessrapid fall.
Themainproblem derives from the hourly wage series used by Lucas and Rap-
ping18 which rises by 12percentin 1934.Thisreflects a 4percentrise inannual
compensationper full-time employee and a 7.2 percent fall in hours of work. Other
series on hourly wages show a similar jump in 1934 due to a large decline in re-
ported hours and a small increase in annual wages.'9 This is extremely peculiar
behavior for the average hours of rk which is normally a very reliable leading8
(1959)
indicator——leading more at peaks than at troughs. Indeed Gerhard Bry's study of the
average work week showed only one cycle in average weekly hours not corresponding to
a reference cycle: the peak of July 1933 and troughof September 1934.
The explanation for this exceptional behavior of hours and wages is easy to
find: The National Industrial Recovery Act (passed June 16, 1933) and succeeding
legislation. NRA codes and later wage and hours laws, aimed at limiting the hours
of work and increasing hourly wages. Significantly, Bry (p. 107) reports: "The
sample reporting manhours expanded greatly between 1932 and 1934, large because
of cooperation by the various code authorities of the NRA." Now this reported fall
in average hours and rise in wages could reflect some combination of three factors:
(1) whole-hearted compliance with the law and codes; (2) a change in firms' repor-
ting practices—entirely legal—so as to eliminate inclusion of rest and meal
breaks in reported hours; and (3) falsification of reported hours and wages as
part of an evasion scheme. A cynical economist such as the author might suspect
that the data primarily reflect items (2) and (3), but this is clearly a topic
for detailed historical research.2° If the change in hours is largely spurious,
average earnings per full-time equivalent employee would more accuratelyreflect
the development of wages in the 1930's.
In any case, traditional models of search have used "the wage" as a short-
hand expression for total conditions of employment. This concept would appear
to be better represented by annual earnings of full-time workers—or of all em-
ployees—in a period in which total hours are being rationed.
In view of these questions concerning the use of reported hourly wages,
equation (1) was estimated for 1930 to 1941 using the corrected Lebergott un-
employment rate, average annual earnings per full-time employee, and the GNP
price deflator for Ut, W and P, respectively.21 The anticipated levels of
wages and prices were estimated by a simple adaptive expectationsformulation:
(2) +(l..)(1+g1)W19
+(1-A)(l+g2)P1
Here ,isthe coefficient of adjustment and g1 and g2 are the trend growth rates
of wages and prices.22 More elaborate models of anticipations might well yield
better explanations, but were not tried because of the scarcity of degrees of
freedom.I use the word anticipations instead of expectations by way of reminder
that short-run aggregate supply or Phillips curve reflect past expectations of
current prices, as embodied in contracts, as well as current expectations of
searchers.
Equation (1) was estimated by a simple maximum likelihood technique. OLS re-
gressions were run conditional upon the value of A for A —0.0.025,0.05,....,
0.95,0.975. The maximum likelihood estimateis:23
(4) u —8.87-22.80log (Wt/W*) -57.51log
(0.74)(17.65) (23.47)
12.00 -1.29 -2.45
SEE.'l.70, R2(cor.)"0.926, D-W1.68, 3—0.l75 (0.075,0.35]
The simple model does rather well at explaining the fluctuations in the unemploy-
ment rate over the period 1930-1941. One suspects that the standard error of esti-
mate and 92 percent R-squared must be overoptimistic. The constant term is well
below the sample mean of the dependent variable (13.9 percent) but s significantly
above the natural rate of unemployment of about 5 percent. The independent varia-
bles are rather collinear and it was observed that higher values of A (within the
confidence interval) increase the relative coefficient and significance of
Log(Wt/W)
and conversely for lower values of A •TheA estimate is lower than
Lucas and Rapping estimate which was inferred, however, from the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable in a Koyck transformation of equation (1).
These results are best interpreted as negating the view that anticipations-
search models have no role in explaining unemployment during 1934-1941. Only a
much broader study incorporating postwar data and New Deal institutional changes
could provide a clear picture as to the amount of excess unemployment which can
be attributed to normal search behavior versus the amount caused by New Deal programs.10
IV.Conclusionsand Summary
This paper radically alters our empirical conception of unemployment during
the 1930's. The fact that unemployment rose to nearly one quarter of the labor
force in 1932-1933 is unchanged, but that fact is readily explained by the heroic
ineptness of Federal Reserve policy. What is changed is the "un-fact" that re-
covery was extremely slow from 1934 through 1941. From 1933 to 1936,the corrected
unemployment rate fell by nearly 5 percentage points per year andthere is every
reason to suppose that the rate would have been about 5 percent by1938 had the
Fed not doubled reserve requirements between August 1936 and May1937.
To be sure, during 1934-1940 between 4½ to 7 percent of the labor force was
employed in contracyclical, make-work public construction jobs,but there is
little empirical evidence in the postwar period that the government spendingmul..
tiplier is much above zero over such a long period as two orthree years. Cer-
tainly the unemployment rate behaves as if the federal programscrowded out pri-
vateeiup1oymentpartiCularlY on the state and local construction works which
would otherwise have been required.
In Section III, it was seen that the utter inability reported by Lucasand
Rapping of anticipations-search models to explain unemployment duringthe re-
covery period 1934-1941 can be attributed in part to errorsin the unemployment
data and in part to the use of an inappropriate hourly wage plagued bythe in-
troduction of reporting biases with the advent of the NRA. Only abroader study
over an extended time period can provide a realisticestimate of the residual
increase in unemployment that might be directlyattributable to such programs
as the NRA. But It is clear that the cyclicalbehavior of unemployment in the
1930's generally conforms to movements in actual versus expected wagesand prices
as predicted by modern natural-rate models.11
In sunnnary, a major conceptual error in the standard BLS andLebergottdata
has been uncovered. Emergency workers (employees of federal contracyclical pro-
grams such as WPA) were counted as unemployed due to the use of an implicit de-
finition of "normal jobs to be created" instead of the standard job-seekers de-
finition. Estimates were affected for 1933-1943 and, during 1934-1941, by huge
amounts—2 to 3½ million unemployed people or about 4 to 7 percentage points on
the unemployment rate. The corrected data reveal a strong movement toward the
natural unemployment rate after 1933. A simple anticipations-search model of the
Lucas-Rapping type explains the corrected date very well when average full-time
earnings are used as the nominal wage, but further research is required on the
possible influence of NRA and similar programs in increasing the unemployment rate.12
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FOOTNOTES
'Specific reference is to the series Bl (Lebergott) and B2 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics) reported in Dept. of Commerce (1973).
2LaWreflce R. Klein was listed as Chief, Office of Publications of the BLS.
3Most notably, the Bureau of the Census and the National Industrial Conference
Board (NICB). A typical Census publication reads: "On the basis of the answers to
these questions, persons in the labor force were classified into the following em-
ployment status categories: (a) 'Employed (except on public emergency work),' in-
cluding those reported as at work and those with a job but not at work; and (b) un-
employed, including those On public emergency work' and those 'Seeking work."
Bureau of the Census, (1944, p. 2). Similarly, "Unemployment—The difference be-
tween the number of persons in the labor force and the number of persons employed.
Persons on the payrolls of government emergency relief projects, such as WPA, CCC,
and out-of-school NYA, are not considered employed." NICB (1945, p. 389).
4This is Bureau of the Census (1947). At page 1, it states: "During the
period in which public emergency work projects were being conducted by the Works
Project Administration (WPA), the National Youth Administration (NYA), the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) and State and local work rellef agencies (this period
ended about June 1943), persons at work on, or assigned to, such projects were
also included among the unemployed." I suspect that almost no one currently at
the BLS is aware that they are reporting (for example, Employment and Earniflgs,
April 1975, p. 19) data for 1933-1943 which includes emergency workers among the
unemployed. Certainly the standard explanatory notes (pp. 135-142 for the same
issue) state that"employed persons comprise (a) all those who during the survey
week did any work at all as paid employees,..." count people currently on similar
government programs as employed, and mention no problems under"Historic Compara-
bility."
5Lebergott (1957, p. 229); repeated verbatim in Lebergott (1964, pp. 184-185).15
6The national income accounts show state and local work-relief wages (in
millions of dollars) as:
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
4 46 92 34168079174 48 8 10 10 6
Data from Dept. of Commerce (1947), Table 14, p. 27.
7Emergency Relief and Construction Act of July 21, 1932, title I, sec. la.
8Dept. of Commerce (1966, P. 98).
9The Commerce Department (1966, p. 98) estimates of the number of state and
local work relief workers for 1930-1932 are 20 thousand, 299 thousand, and 592
thousand.
0The conditions of the major programs are summarized in Appendices 2 through
5 of the National Resources Planning Board (1942). Wages were generally set at
"prevailingt' or "fair" levels for the skill class of the work, or at minimum rates
where higher than the market wage.
1On this view, employment can exceed the "normal" labor force and negative
unemployment is reported as in 1906, 1917-1919, and 1942-1944. NICB (1965, pp. 38-
39). Milton Friedman suggested it might be interesting to compute the unemploy-
ment rate for the postwar era on the definition of unemployment as job-seekers
plus employees of "make-work" jobs. Unfortunately it is much easier to estimate
which make-work employees were counted as unemployed in the 1930's than to esti-
mate the number of postwar government (and private?) employees on make-work jobs.
a strict application of the modern definition, which Counts part-time
workers, would include these people as employed.
'3A word of warning should be given about the Census Bureau data on the dura-
tion of unemployment. These too should be taken with a large grain of salt because
"Etihe duration of unemployment represents the length of time(upto March 30,
1940) during which these persons had been seeking work or working on public16
emergency projects." Bureau of the Census (1943, P. 7).
14Lebergott explicitly adopted (1964, pp. 407-408) the BLS figures on unem-
ployment f or 1929-1939 because his revised estimates differed only slightly from
the BLS data already in widespread use. To maintain consistency, Lebergott reported
employment as his revised labor force estimates less the BLS unemployment data.
From 1940 onwards, Lebergott adopted the BLS data without change.
5Lebergott (1964, p. 188).
16Lebergott (1964, p. 189) reports a decade average of 4 percent for the
1900's and 18 percent for the 1930's. The corrected data (cols. (16) and (17) of
Table 3) show a 1930's average of 15 percent but 4 percent for the 1940's.
17Lucas and Rapping used the Lebergott estimates of unemployment. Their dis-
cussion starts in 1930 instead of 1929, apparently because of data availability in
series not considered here. They were fortunate in this regard as no reasonable
model could explain the reported 3.2 percent unemployment rate in 1929—a drop of
1 percentage point from 1928. The 1930 unemployment rate of 8.9 percent seems re-
liable because of the decennial census, but It is incredible that a bit under 10
percent drop In real GNP could be associated with a 5.7 percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate from 1929 to 1930.
'8This is the Commerce Department (1966) estimates of compensation of employees
In all industries (line 1, pp. 90-93) divided by the product of (a) the number of
full-time equivalent employees in all industries (ibid., line 1, pp. 102-105) and
(b) the average annual hours per employee (Denison, p. 37—not p. 85—column (3)).
Unfortunately Lucas and Rapping (1969, p. 742, n. 27) had misinterpreted their
(secondary) source as reporting "annual hours worked per year by full-time employees"
when it in fact reports "actual average annual hours per employee" as is seen in
the original presentation by James Knowles (p. 26).
19See for example, series such as D626 and D627 on wages and hours In manu-
facturing in Bureau of the Census (1960, p. 92).17
20Such as in the thesis of Michael Weinstein, currently underway at M.I.T.
It has been argued, most recently by Robert Hall, that the NRA codes and the suc-
ceeding wage and hour laws raised wages by fiat and so changed the character of
unemployment from search unemployment (1929-1933) to minimum wage unemployment
(1934-1941). This Is a competing but possibly complementary hypothesis to that
in the text. Recent papers by Finis Welch and Jacob Mincer note that the main
effect of such laws would be on the distribution of employment between covered
and uncovered sectors rather than the unemployment rate per se. Further research
on the precise effects of these institutional changes is clearly called for.
21TheUt data are from Table 3, col. (16). The W series for 1929-1941
are Cotmuerce Department data (series D696, Bureau of the Census (1960), p. 95).
It was extended back to 1924 by using the Kuznets estimates (series D685, ibid.)
and a ratio splice based on the 1929 overlap. This earnings series is $19 to
$21 less than average FTE compensation f or 1930-1935, but this difference rises
to $50 by 1937 and $63 by 1941 because of the inclusion of employer social secur-
ity and unemployment insurance taxes. This increase in. employer taxes would not
represent a wage increase from the point of view of a job-seeking worker; so the
earnings series was used. The series for 1929-1941 is Commerce Department
data (series B62, Dept. of Commerce (1973), pp. 222-23). It was extended back
to 1924 by using the NBER-Kendrick estimates (series B61, ibid.) and a 1929
ratio splice.
22The required initial values of W and Pt were taken as equal to the actual
values in 1924, a year in which Lebergott estimates a 5.0 percent unemployment
rate. The anticipated growth rate of prices g2 was taken as 0 which is consonant
with both the gold standard and actual experience from 1921-1941. The correspond-
ing anticipated growth rate of nominal (and real) wages was estimated as 1 l/37
per annum.18
23The standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients and
abovethe t-statistics. The reported statistics have been adjusted for the loss
of a degree of freedom in fitting A.A greater than 90 percent confidence in-
terval on A (based on the asymptolic distribution of the logarithm of the likeli-








Average Annual Wages Relative Wage
of Emergency Emergency All
Workers Industry Workers
(Thousands) (Dollars) (Dollars) (Percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1933 471 755.83 1,048 72.1
1934 2,475 508.69 1,091 46.6
1935 2,575 469.51 1,137 41.3
1936 3,653 595.13 1,184 50.3
1937 2,707 605.10 1,258 48.1
1938 3,572 590.71 1,230 48.0
1939 3,216 583.02 1,264 46.1
1940 2,792 565.54 1,300 43.5
1941 2,192 553.38 1,443 38.3
1942 909 638.06 1,709 37.3
1943 85 588.24 1,951 30.2
Sources: Column (1): Federal work relief full-time and part-time employees,
Table 6.3, line 78, pp. 98, 99, of Dept. of Coimierce (1966).
For 1934 and 1935, 1335 thousand and 1585 thousand, respec-
tively, employees of FERA's state-administered Emergency
Work-Relief Program are added on the basis of annual aver-
age of monthly data for April 1934-December 1935 in Table 13.
3rd col., p. 46, of WPA (1942). Slightly different data
(taken from preliminary reports such as FERA (1936) but
showing monthly breakdowns by program) on the emergency
government labor force are available in NICB (1941, 1945).
Column (2): Wages and salaries of federal work relief employees, Table
6.2, line 78, pp. 94, 95, of Dept. of Conmierce (1966) di-
vided by column 1. For 1934 and 1935, $495 million and
$598 million, respectively have been added to wages and
salaries as the proportionate share of FERA workers in20
total state and local work relief wages reported (ibtd.,
line 84) for those years. This is a minimum estimate as
work relief recipients in state and local programs in 1933
averaged less than half the average for 1934.
Column (3): Average annual earnings per full-time employee in all in-
dustries, series D696, Bureau of the Census (1960, p. 95).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lebergott BLS Corrected Corjected
BLS Lebergott
(14) (15) (16) (17)
1929 3.2 3.2 3.2 • 3.2
1930 8.9 8.7 8.9 8.7









17.0 1934 22.0 21.7 17.2
•
1935 20.3 20.1 15.4 15.2
1936 17.0 16.9 10.1 10.1
1937 14.3 14.3 . 9.3 9.2
1938 19.1 19.0 12.5 12.5
1939 17.2 17.2 11.3 11.3
1940 14.6 14.6 9.6 9.6
1941 9.9 9.9 6.0 6.0
1942 4.7 4.7 3.1 3.1
1943 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8
tn percentagepoints.
aThe number of state and local work-relief recipients was substantial
for the year 1933. ClassificatIon of the estimated 1,724 thousand re-
cipients as employed would decrease the corrected unemploymentrates
further to 20.97. (Lebergott) and 20.67. (BLS). Other years forwhich
classification of state and local work-relief recipients as employed
would reduce the rates reported in cols. (16) and (17) by more than
0.2 percentage points are 1931 (0.6 reduction), 1932 (1.2),1934 (1.0),
and 1935 (1.0).
Sources:Column (14) —Col.(12)/Col. (5).
Column (15) —Col.(12)/Col.(6).
Column (16) —Col.(13)/Col. (5).
Column (17) =Col.,(13)/Col. (6).
.
Standard and Corrected Data, 1929-1943
.